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ESSAY 
“THERE MUST BE A MEANS”—THE BACKWARD 
JURISPRUDENCE OF BAZE V. REES 
Nadia N. Sawicki* 
The Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Baze v. Rees begins with 
a seemingly simple assertion of constitutional law.1  “We begin with 
the principle, settled by Gregg, that capital punishment is constitu-
tional.”2  It continues, “[i]t necessarily follows that there must be a 
means of carrying it out.”3  This second pronouncement provides the 
foundation for the Supreme Court’s holding in Baze that Kentucky’s 
refusal to modify its lethal injection procedure does not violate the 
Eighth Amendment.  However, in taking the position that the consti-
tutionality of an existing method of capital punishment is dependent 
on the availability of alternative execution procedures, the Supreme 
Court has turned Eighth Amendment jurisprudence on its head, es-
tablishing a dangerous loophole that could imperil our most impor-
tant constitutional protections.  This essay highlights the error in the 
Court’s reasoning in Baze and considers the potentially troubling 
consequences of applying this reasoning to other areas of constitu-
tional law. 
* * * 
In Baze v. Rees, two death row prisoners brought an Eighth 
Amendment challenge to Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol.4  The 
protocol in question required that a team of individuals, each having 
at least one year’s experience as a medical assistant, phlebotomist, or 
paramedic, intravenously administer a series a three drugs that lead 
 
 * Assistant Professor at Loyola University Chicago School of Law, Beazley Institute for 
Health Law and Policy; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School; M.Bioeth., University 
of Pennsylvania School of Medicine. 
 1  553 U.S. 35 (2008) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177 (1976)). 
 2 Id. at 47. 
 3 Id. (emphasis added). 
 4 Id. at 40. 
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to the prisoner’s death.5  The Kentucky protocol prohibited physician 
involvement in the procedure, except as necessary to certify the cause 
of death or, in the case of a last-minute stay of execution, to revive the 
prisoner.6  The Baze petitioners argued that because the members of 
the team administering the lethal drugs had limited qualifications 
and training, the protocol posed an “unnecessary risk” of pain and 
suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment.7  The petitioners al-
so identified alternative procedures (involving licensed physicians 
and a different series of drugs) that Kentucky could adopt to lessen 
this risk. 
The Supreme Court rejected the petitioners’ proposed “unneces-
sary risk” standard.  Instead, it held that an execution method does 
not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and un-
usual punishment unless it presents a “substantial” or “objectively in-
tolerable” risk of serious harm.8  The Court also responded directly to 
petitioners’ claim that Kentucky erred by failing to adopt safer execu-
tion procedures.9  A petitioner “cannot successfully challenge a 
[s]tate’s method of execution,” wrote the Court, “merely by showing 
a slightly or marginally safer alternative.”10  Rather, to demonstrate 
that a state’s refusal to modify its execution procedure violates the 
Eighth Amendment, the Court held that a petitioner must identify an 
alternative procedure that is “feasible, readily implemented, and in 
fact significantly reduce[s] a substantial risk of severe pain.”11  With 
respect to the alternative procedures proposed by the petitioners in 
Baze, the plurality noted that petitioners were unable to show that 
these procedures actually reduce a substantial risk of pain12 and, 
moreover, that at least one of the proposed alternatives was not feasi-
ble.13 
 
 5 The first drug, sodium thiopental (Pentothal), is a short-acting barbiturate.  The second 
drug, pancuronium bromide (Pavulon), is a paralytic agent.  The third drug, potassium 
chloride, stops the heart.  Id. at 44–45. 
 6  Id. at 46. 
 7 Id. at 47. 
 8 Id. at 50–51. 
 9 One of the questions presented in Baze was:  “Do the means for carrying out an execution 
cause an unnecessary risk of pain and suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment 
upon a showing that readily available alternatives that pose less risk of pain and suffering 
could be used?”  Brief for Petitioners at i, Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008), (No. 07-5439).   
 10 Baze, 553 at 51. 
 11 Id. at 52.  The petitioners must also demonstrate that the state has no “legitimate peno-
logical justification” for its refusal to adopt the alternative.  Id. 
 12 Id. at 57–59 (noting that the additional procedures requested by petitioners have not 
been scientifically proven to reduce the risk of pain). 
 13 “The asserted need for a professional anesthesiologist to interpret the BIS monitor read-
ings is nothing more than an argument against the entire procedure, given that both 
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In so holding, the Court answered two questions—first, what the 
appropriate standard of risk is in Eighth Amendment cases challeng-
ing the method of capital punishment; and second, what effect, if 
any, the availability of alternative procedures may have.  However, in 
presenting its discussion of the “availability of alternatives” as a core 
part of its holding, the Court not only muddied the theoretical wa-
ters, but in fact took a position on this issue that seems fundamentally 
incorrect. 
If we begin with the premise, established in Baze, that an execu-
tion method is constitutional unless it presents a “substantial risk of 
serious harm,” then it is difficult to see why the availability of alterna-
tive execution procedures would be relevant, let alone dispositive.  
That is, if a state’s execution procedure does not pose a substantial 
risk of serious harm (as the Court found to be the case with the Ken-
tucky protocol), then it does not violate the Eighth Amendment, re-
gardless of any available alternatives.14  If, on the other hand, an ex-
ecution procedure by its very nature poses a “substantial risk of 
serious harm,” then presumably it is unconstitutional, at least as a 
prima facie matter.  In this case, as well, the availability of alternative 
procedures would not seem to affect the substantive constitutional 
analysis—the existence of a safer alternative might strengthen the 
finding of unconstitutionality, but the lack of a safer alternative 
would not render an unconstitutional method permissible.  Or would 
it?  The position seemingly taken by the Supreme Court in Baze sug-
gests that perhaps it would. 
In a case in which a state is using a substantially risky execution 
procedure but evidence fails to identify a safer alternative, a court has 
two options.  It can find the procedure unconstitutional as a defini-
tional matter based on the substantial risk standard (in which case 
the availability of alternatives is irrelevant); this seems to be the logi-
cal solution.  Or, potentially, the court could uphold the admittedly 
risky procedure on the grounds that there is no better alternative.  If 
we are to take seriously the Supreme Court’s holding in Baze about 
the constitutional implications of alternative execution procedures—
 
Kentucky law and the American Society of Anesthesiologists’ own ethical guidelines pro-
hibit anesthesiologists from participating in capital punishment.”  Id. at 59–60 (internal 
citations omitted); see also id. at 64–65 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing a policy statement by 
the American Medical Association’s Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, which states 
that “[a] physician, as a member of a profession dedicated to preserving life when there is 
hope of doing so, should not be a participant in a legally authorized execution” (altera-
tion in original) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
 14 In such a case, the availability of better alternatives would not impact the constitutional 
analysis because there is no “substantial risk” to be lessened. 
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that is, if it is to carry any substantive weight—then we cannot help 
but conclude that the availability of alternatives would make a differ-
ence in at least some cases.  In other words, while the availability of 
alternatives would never make unconstitutional a constitutional ex-
ecution procedure, a lack of feasible alternatives might save a facially 
prohibited procedure.  This result, I argue, is one that we cannot ac-
cept. 
What do we really mean when we talk about the constitutionality 
of capital punishment?  Gregg v. Georgia, cited in Baze, held that “the 
infliction of death as a punishment for murder is not without justifi-
cation and thus is not unconstitutionally severe.”15  In so holding, 
however, the Supreme Court answered in the negative only the broad 
question of whether a death sentence is a penalty that is inherently 
disproportionate to the crime of murder (as compared to other poss-
ible penalties, such as life imprisonment or hard labor).  It did not, 
however, speak to the specific methods by which the death penalty 
may be permissibly imposed, except to say that “the punishment must 
not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”16  Indeed, 
the bulk of the Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence in the 
past century and a half has focused on the question of proportionali-
ty, rather than methodology.17  Only three times in its history has the 
Court considered the constitutionality of a particular method of capi-
tal punishment; each time, the Court has upheld the method at issue, 
finding that it does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.18  
The Court had never used the constitutionality of capital punishment 
under a proportionality analysis as a general matter to defend a par-
ticular method of execution.  In Baze, however, the Court took this 
position quite explicitly, finding that because capital punishment is 
constitutional as a matter of principle under Gregg, “[i]t necessarily 
follows that there must be a means of carrying it out” in a constitu-
 
 15 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).  
 16 Id. at 173.  Indeed, the Court in Gregg expressly distinguished its decision about propor-
tionality from prior Supreme Court decisions about methodology.  Id. at 170–71. 
 17 See Katie Roth Heilman, Comment, Contemplating “Cruel and Unusual”:  A Critical Analysis 
of Baze v. Rees in the Context of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment “Proportionality” Juri-
sprudence, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 633, 640–43 (2009) (discussing post-Gregg challenges to the 
constitutionality of the death penalty as focused on the issue of “disproportionate pu-
nishment”). 
 18 See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (holding that, where a 
first attempt at execution by electrocution was unsuccessful as a result of an “unforeseea-
ble accident,” a second attempt would not violate the Eighth Amendment); In re Kemm-
ler, 136 U.S. 436, 448 (1890) (refusing to reexamine the New York court’s holding in fa-
vor of a statute authorizing execution by electrocution); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 
130 (1878) (upholding the constitutionality of execution by firing squad). 
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tional manner.19  This conclusion is also supported by the Court’s 
holding regarding alternative execution procedures, which suggests 
that the availability of alternatives may be relevant to the constitu-
tional analysis of an existing procedure. 
The problem with this reasoning should be clear:  Using the con-
stitutional permissibility of a death sentence as a theoretical matter to 
uphold a specific method of capital punishment defies the notion of 
constitutional protection.  Constitutional protections exist to protect 
citizens in precisely those situations where the state would seek to 
override them on the grounds of utility, yet the Supreme Court in 
Baze seems to do just that.  Consider the following hypothetical:  Im-
agine that all legal executions in America took place in a mysterious 
“black box” that has fallen from space, marked only with a sign read-
ing, “Death Apparatus for Condemned Prisoners.”  The prisoner en-
ters the black box, the door locks behind him automatically, and, af-
ter some specified period of time, the door opens, revealing the 
deceased prisoner.  There is no noise, there are no marks on the 
prisoner, and autopsy technology is not advanced enough to deter-
mine the cause of death.  Neither the warden nor onlookers have any 
idea what happens in the box, except that it inevitably results in the 
prisoner’s death.  As a matter of definition, therefore, it is simply im-
possible to know what the prisoner is experiencing in the box, 
whether he is suffering any pain, and whether more traditional me-
thods of execution (hanging, firing squad, lethal gas) might be less 
painful.  According to Baze, the black box method of execution would 
be constitutionally permissible because no plaintiff would be able to 
demonstrate that it entails a substantial risk of severe pain. 
Imagine, now, that technology has advanced such that scientists 
are able to determine exactly what takes place in the “Death Appara-
tus for Condemned Prisoners.”  It turns out that the black box houses 
an alien life form that releases a biological agent affecting human 
nerve cells.  A prisoner who enters an enclosed container with this 
life form experiences excruciating nerve pain for six hours, akin to 
the feeling of being burned alive.  After that time, the nerves, brain, 
and spinal cord simply shut down, and the prisoner dies.  Imagine, 
furthermore, that for some reason or another, there exist no alterna-
tive methods of execution—in this world, guns have been banned; 
prison officials are not permitted to hold any weapons, even for legi-
timate penal purposes; and humans have developed natural defenses 
to the lethal gas and deadly drugs once used for executions.  If the 
 
 19 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 (2008). 
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Supreme Court’s holding in Baze is to be taken seriously, then the 
black box execution method, no matter how agonizing, would be 
constitutionally permitted on the grounds that there exist no feasible, 
readily implemented, and less painful alternatives. 
Readers may question the legitimacy of this hypothetical, and I 
admit that it is somewhat fanciful.  That said, the most vehement crit-
ics of lethal injection technology might view the black box scenario as 
an apt analogy, given that the second drug in the standard three-drug 
protocol is a paralytic that effectively masks any outward evidence of 
what the prisoner might be experiencing.20  Furthermore, the paucity 
of scientific and medical research in this area makes it difficult to 
know whether and to what extent a prisoner might suffer if the drugs 
are improperly administered (which is not an uncommon occur-
rence).21  Moreover, one could argue that, due to limitations imposed 
by the Constitution and by principles of medical and research ethics, 
there are few, reasonable alternatives to the current three-drug pro-
tocol.22  In other words, while we currently have a basic sense of what 
happens during an execution by lethal injection, our knowledge is 
necessarily limited in much the same way as in the black box scena-
rio. 
* * * 
I argue that an execution procedure that poses a substantial risk 
of severe pain cannot be bootstrapped into constitutional permissibil-
ity by reference to the constitutionality of capital punishment as a 
general matter and the lack of identified alternative procedures.  In 
such cases, the appropriate solution is to reject the existing method 
of capital punishment and work harder to identify alternative me-
thods that do not pose a risk of severe pain—not to maintain the ex-
isting procedure out of necessity. 
This distinction between constitutionality of a practice in theory 
and its implementation in fact is an essential part of our constitution-
al jurisprudence.  To draw just one comparison, the Supreme Court 
 
 20 See generally Mark Heath, The Medicalization of Execution:  Lethal Injection in the United States, 
in PUBLIC HEALTH BEHIND BARS:  FROM PRISONS TO COMMUNITIES 92, 92–93 (Ro-
bert Greifinger ed., 2007) (discussing the masking effects of pancuronium bromide and 
the physical pain that prisoners may feel when they undergo lethal injection). 
 21 See Nadia N. Sawicki, Doctors, Discipline, and the Death Penalty:  Professional Implications of Safe 
Harbor Policies, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 107, 158–159 n.245 (2008) (citing evidence of 
administration errors dating back to the first execution by lethal injection in 1982). 
 22 See Baze, 553 U.S. at 57–59 (describing the inadequacy of additional procedures proposed 
by petitioners).   
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held in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I) that segregated educa-
tional facilities violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.23  After Brown I, some states were unwilling or 
unable to transition to an inclusive system of public education, lead-
ing the Court to take up the issue of administration in a later opi-
nion.24  Citing the importance of the plaintiffs’ personal interests in 
indiscriminate admission to public schools, the Court insisted that 
states make good faith attempts to comply with its ruling despite the 
“variety of obstacles,” “complexities,” and “local school problems” in-
volved.25  Ultimately, this required massive changes not only to the 
drawing of school districts, but also to the physical plants of the pub-
lic schools, their transportation systems, their security systems, and 
even their personnel.  “[I]t should go without saying,” wrote the 
Court, “that the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be 
allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them.”26  Simi-
larly, I argue, the vitality of the constitutional principles underlying 
the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punish-
ment cannot be allowed to yield simply because no clear alternatives 
to current execution technology have been identified. 
Of course, the school segregation narrative differs somewhat from 
the capital punishment narrative in that the Constitution grants a 
positive right to equal protection of the laws, whereas the right to be 
free from cruel and unusual punishment is instead a negative right.  
Had the Constitution also granted a positive right on the part of citi-
zenry to engage in capital punishment, then the Supreme Court’s 
statement in Baze would be more defensible.  If a finding that lethal 
injection violates the Eighth Amendment means that the state is una-
ble to implement a (hypothetical) constitutional duty to execute its 
worst offenders, then perhaps it makes sense to choose to protect this 
right first and retain the existing lethal injection procedure.27  On the 
 
 23 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954), reargued on the question of relief, 349 
U.S. 294 (1955). 
 24 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 25 Id. at 299–300. 
 26 Id. at 300. 
 27 For a similar argument, consider Ronald Dworkin’s conclusion that where there is no 
choice but to violate one of two conflicting individual rights, it is morally permissible to 
violate the less important one.  RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 193–94 
(1977).  Indeed, Dworkin argues that it is actually the government’s job to make such de-
cisions when rights are in conflict, noting that “it is the job of government to discrimi-
nate.”  Id. at 193.  I, however, disagree with Dworkin’s conclusion that the state, when 
faced with the violation of two competing rights, would be morally justified in making ei-
ther decision on the basis of necessity.  I do not find logical necessity a sufficient moral 
justification in this case.  Arguably, either course of action may be morally permissible, in 
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other hand, perhaps the school segregation narrative is not so differ-
ent—the Federal Constitution does not establish a positive right to 
education; accordingly, faced with the challenge of implementing an 
unpopular desegregation policy, states could (barring state constitu-
tional requirements) have simply abandoned the practice of provid-
ing public education altogether.  Instead, state courts and elected of-
ficials worked against a sea of practical and political problems to 
implement the Supreme Court’s judgment. 
* * * 
Given these implications, why, one wonders, did the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Baze even address the availability of alternative ex-
ecution procedures?  The Court could have easily upheld Kentucky’s 
lethal injection procedure simply by establishing the “substantial risk 
of severe pain” standard and finding that the Kentucky protocol did 
not pose such a risk.  The discussion of alternative procedures was 
neither necessary nor particularly relevant to the Court’s final deci-
sion.28 
The best explanation for why the Court took this approach, I po-
sit, is because it wanted to take advantage of the opportunity provided 
in Baze to offer states another avenue of appeal in Eighth Amend-
ment cases.  Had the Court not addressed the issue of alternative 
procedures in Baze, then the next time a litigant persuaded a lower 
court that his state’s execution procedure posed a substantial risk of 
serious harm (or, at least, a more substantial risk than that posed by 
the Kentucky lethal injection procedure), the state might have no 
choice but to amend its procedure.  By establishing a second consti-
tutional hurdle for Eighth Amendment litigants to overcome, the 
Court increased the likelihood that a state could wage a successful de-
fense in such cases.  In fact, the Court’s holding about alternative ex-
ecution procedures may have a significant impact on trial practice in 
Eighth Amendment cases:  State attorneys general will likely focus 
their efforts at trial on excluding as much evidence as possible re-
garding alternative procedures.  Because the evidentiary hurdle for 
plaintiffs under the Supreme Court’s Baze standard is so high—they 
must identify an alternative procedure and demonstrate that it is not 
only feasible and readily implemented, but also that it substantially 
 
that an actor faced with two, logically inconsistent alternatives cannot be paralyzed by 
morality.  However, neither act seems morally justifiable as the “morally right” thing to do. 
 28 In this sense, the Court’s decision, from a case and controversy perspective, was much 
broader than necessary. 
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reduces the risk of pain—any uncertainties about the availability of 
alternatives will likely be resolved in the state’s favor. 
More importantly, the Supreme Court’s holding about alternative 
procedures in Baze effectively preserves the constitutionality of capital 
punishment as a general practice.  Had the Court not addressed this 
issue, then a plaintiff who successfully demonstrates that his state’s 
execution procedure poses a substantial risk of serious harm might 
also seek to overturn Gregg by arguing that, in fact, none of the availa-
ble alternative procedures satisfy the substantial risk test.  But by spe-
cifying in Baze that neither the constitutionality of a specific execu-
tion method nor the constitutionality of the practice of capital 
punishment in general can be called into question by noting the ab-
sence of alternative procedures, the Court was able to defuse future 
Eighth Amendment challenges in this vein. 
As noted above, I do not believe that the Court’s decision in Baze 
was the appropriate resolution of this issue.  If a state’s execution 
procedure is ever found unconstitutional on the ground that it poses 
a substantial risk of serious harm, and no alternative procedures are 
identified during trial, one obvious solution would be to direct the 
state’s department of correction to make an active effort to investi-
gate and evaluate alternatives beyond those that may have been im-
mediately apparent at trial.29  This would conform with the way in 
which courts typically resolve as-applied challenges—by maintaining 
the validity of a practice as a whole, while invalidating one or more 
particular applications of that practice on constitutional grounds.30  
 
 29 As much was suggested by Justice Ginsburg in her dissenting opinion.  Baze v. Rees, 553 
U.S. 35, 123 (2008) (suggesting that the case be remanded with instructions to consider 
whether the risk of serious harm might be avoided if “readily available safeguards” were 
added to the Kentucky protocol).  Lest critics object that investigating alternative execu-
tion procedures would be an exercise in futility (whether due to opposition from the 
medical and scientific communities or otherwise), note that execution technologies have 
developed dramatically in the past century and a half, advancing from hanging, to firing 
squad, to electrocution, to lethal gas, to, finally, lethal injection.  And while there have 
been no advances in execution technology since the development of lethal injection 
technology in 1976, this seems to be the result of an unwillingness on the part of states to 
consider or investigate other methods, rather than a lack of available methods per se.  See 
Sawicki, supra note 21, at 152 n.220 (noting that the pursuit of alternate methods of capi-
tal punishment has not been explored).  For descriptions of historical attempts by state 
governments to evaluate various execution technologies, see N.Y. COMM’N ON CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE AND REPORT THE MOST 
HUMANE AND PRACTICAL METHOD OF CARRYING INTO EFFECT THE SENTENCE OF DEATH IN 
CAPITAL CASES (1888), and Melvin F. Wingersky, Report of the Royal Commission on Capital 
Punishment (1949-1953):  A Review, 44 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 695 (1954). 
 30 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167 (2007) (holding that a facial challenge to 
the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act should never have been entertained and that an as-
applied challenge is the proper means by which to consider exceptions to the Act); Unit-
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Though it may result in practical difficulties in implementing capital 
punishment, such an approach would be more defensible on theoret-
ical grounds. 
An alternative solution—particularly if attempts to identify alter-
native execution procedures are unsuccessful—might be to reconsid-
er the theoretical presumption that the practice of capital punish-
ment does not violate the Eighth Amendment.  In other words, if all 
(or most) execution methods are found to result in a substantial risk 
of serious harm, then perhaps we ought to rethink the constitutional-
ity of capital punishment as a whole.  While a single as-applied chal-
lenge will not suffice to overturn an established practice, perhaps a 
series of successful challenges might lead a court to conclude that a 
practice that cannot be implemented in fact should be deemed un-
constitutional in theory. 
At this point, I do not stake a claim to one or the other of these 
approaches.  However, it is important that we consider both of them 
as alternatives to the Supreme Court’s current approach, which 
would use a principle of “constitutionality by default” to uphold a pa-
tently problematic execution procedure where no alternatives are 
available. 
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